

Transport Layer Interoperability Cryptography Update

A Discussion Document



Purpose of this presentation

To advise stakeholders on:

- updates drafted for the Transport Layer Interoperability specification
- as it proceeds toward Canadian Draft For Use (CDFU) status in the Standards Collaborative's decision making process
- for feedback and consensus-building

Outline

- The need for changes
- A brief history
- The proposed settings
- Prior lack of support for the proposed settings
- More technical detail

The need for changes

- The Canadian and US federal authorities for cryptography, CSEC and NIST, are deprecating the following key-lengths & algorithms by Dec 31, 2010:
 - 1024 bits re RSA modulus, DSA key size, DH field size
 - 160 bits re ECC modulus
 - 160 bits re SHA/SHA-1
- CSEC and NIST allow the use of 3DES until 2030, but AES is recommended instead

Changes in the TLI specification

- CSEC and NIST have deprecated lesser encryption key lengths and algorithms
- The TLI spec, rather than deprecate:
 - notes that, in general, TLS clients and TLS servers negotiate the strongest mutually shared ciphersuite
 - requires support for sufficient algorithms, which are then used **by default**, for implementations that meet the spec...while also supporting legacy systems
- This approach ensures that the TLI spec:
 - facilitates interoperability
 - supports algorithms & approaches that avoid undue risk, and meet requirements
 - lets each jurisdiction determine their own roadmap/timing for POS systems to meet the TLI spec

A brief history

- The new/current TLI spec is version 3.
 - It is being proposed as a Canadian Draft for Use (CDFU)
 - Some rule numbers have changed since the previous version (v1.02)
 - Going-forward, rule numbers should be stable
- The previous version, v1.02, was published circa February 2009 at the conclusion of:
 - the iEHR Technical II Project TLI stream
 - and many SCWG 6 meetings (and SCWG 8 meetings too)
 - Note (caution): v2.0 is older than v1.02; and v2.0 can still be found on the SCWG 6 forum.

Cryptography in the TLI spec

- the Transport Layer Interoperability (TLI) spec secures the transport &/or payload via ciphersuites
 1. authentication (dig sig) & key exchange
 - PKI, asymmetric encryption
 2. transport encryption
 - symmetric encryption
 3. transport integrity
 - hashes

Updates to cryptography in the TLI spec

1. authentication (dig sig) & key exchange
 - RSA*, DSS/DSA*, **ECDH****, **ECDHE****, **ECDSA****
 - **≥ 2048 bit RSA/DSS/DSA support required**
 - **≥ 224 bit ECC required if supported, ECC preferred**
 - **for key exchange, ECDH not recommended, ECDHE ok**
2. transport encryption
 - AES* (**recommended over**) 3DES/TDEA
 - **≥ 128 bits (effective strength) support required**
3. transport integrity was not updated due to insufficient support for interoperability (at this time)

Past support for these requirements, was limited

- Digital Signature Standard FIPS 186-3 (v3 Jun 2009)
 - v3 updated to support 2048 & 3072 bit DSS and SHA ≥ 224 bits
- Transport Layer Security standard (v1.2 Aug 2008)
 - 1.2 was brand new; fully standardizes extensions for AES and ECC support (AES now built-in) and uses SHA256 for RNG
- WS-I Basic Security Profile (v1.1 Jan 2010)
 - v1.1 recommends AES over 3DES; no mention of ECC, SHA ≥ 224 bits
- Industry & SCWGs
 - have since upgraded root and intermediate CA keys to 2048 bits
 - SCWGs and HIG did not previously identify these requirements

Insufficient support for better transport integrity

Transport integrity

- ~~MD5~~[^], SHA-1^{^^} **and ideally SHA256****, **SHA384****, **SHA512** to support hashes \geq 256 bits**

Defined in the Secure Hash Standard FIPS 180-3 (v3 Oct 2008)

Not supported in:

- TLS 1.0 (widely implemented)
- TLS 1.1 (not widely supported)
- AES Ciphersuites for TLS
- ECC: Suite B Profile for TLS (TLS 1.1 transitional profile)

Only supported in:

- TLS 1.2 (very sparsely supported)
- ECC: Suite B Profile for TLS (TLS 1.2 profile)
- ECC: TLS EC Ciphersuites w SHA-256/384 and AES GCM



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The End
(references follow)

References (1 of 3)

- Digital Signature Standard
 - http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips186-3/fips_186-3.pdf
- Secure Hash Standard
 - http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-3/fips180-3_final.pdf
- Transport Layer Security Protocol
 - <http://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc2246> (v1.0)
 - <http://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc4346> (v1.1)
 - <http://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc5246> (v1.2)
- WS-I Basic Security Profile v1.1
 - <http://www.ws-i.org/Profiles/BasicSecurityProfile-1.1.html>
- RFC 5430 Suite B Profile for TLS
 - <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5430>
- AES Ciphersuites for TLS
 - <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3268>
- TLS Elliptic Curve Ciphersuites with SHA256...
 - <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5289>

References (2 of 3)

- CSEC ITSA 11D - general crypto guidance
 - <http://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/its-sti/publications/itsa-asti/itsa11d-eng.html>
- CSEC ITSB 60 - TLS crypto guidance
 - <http://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/its-sti/publications/itsb-bsti/itsb60-eng.html>
- NIST SP 800-57 Parts 1, 2, 3 - crypto guidance
 - http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57-Part1-revised2_Mar08-2007.pdf
 - <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/SP800-57-Part2.pdf>
 - http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57_PART3_key-management_Dec2009.pdf
- Schneier, Bruce. Applied Cryptography 2nd ed.

References (3 of 3)

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- Lenstra (updated)
 - <http://www.keylength.com/biblio/Handbook of Information Security - Keylength.pdf>
- EuroCrypt II 03/2010
 - <http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/documents/D.SPA.13.pdf>
- NIST
 - http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/key_management.html
- FNISA
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 - <http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/148572/publicationFile/3994/2010AlgoKatpdf.pdf>